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1 Mediated Visibility as Making Vitriol 
Meaningful
Daniel Trottier, Qian Huang and Rashid Gabdulhakov
Abstract
When engaged in vitriol through digital media, users harm their peers not 
only through the caustic nature of their words, but also by the way in which 
they can make their targets visible to public scrutiny. Social platforms 
and mobile devices enable individuals to author commentary about their 
targets, but also compel other types of actors to join in (or to contest, 
appropriate or derail) malicious exchanges. By focusing on highly visible 
yet comparatively mundane forms of denunciation in China, Russia and 
the United Kingdom, this chapter considers how vitriol can be manifest 
as a form of civic engagement. These cases provide insight about a more 
prevalent form of vigilantism that may be located at the margins of what 
is considered acceptable in their respective social contexts.
Keywords: vigilantism, denunciation, digital media, social media, public 
space
Situating vigilantism and visibility in relation to the study of vitriol
When engaged in vitriol online, users harm their peers not only through 
the caustic nature of their words, but also by the way in which they can 
make their targets visible to public scrutiny. In addition to denunciatory 
and hateful language, it is important to consider the conditions in which 
these utterances are produced and circulated, especially in determining 
the severity of their social impact. Mediated visibility, notably the strategic 
and multi-actor manipulation of a targeted individual’s visibility features 
prominently in vitriolic practices.
Polak, Sara, and Daniel Trottier (eds), Violence and Trolling on Social Media. Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam University Press 2020
doi: 10.5117/9789462989481_ch01
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Contemporary vitriol is primarily expressed through digital media. Social 
platforms and mobile devices enable individuals to author commentary 
about their targets, but also to compel other types of actors to join in (or to 
contest, appropriate, or derail) malicious exchanges. These other users, who 
we can tentatively consider as an audience, may simply view the content in 
question, a seemingly passive act that will be registered by the platform as a 
popularity metric, in turn contributing to the broader imagined community 
of judging onlookers. Technical features of social platforms and mobile 
devices, such as the ability to ‘share’ or ‘retweet’, as well as algorithms that 
sort and re-arrange volumes of user-generated content, extend the scope 
and range of vitriolic practices. Though some platforms might have been 
designed with particular professional or demographic contexts in mind, they 
can be adopted for any number of purposes, especially if these purposes 
end up serving the platform’s business model of commanding attention and 
collecting personal information. As such, many sites have become gathering 
points for populist interventions. For example, in the context of Brexit, 
Facebook groups such as South East Alliance and Pie & Mash Squad serve as 
venues for nationalist and anti-immigrant sentiment.1 This involves posting 
news articles and links to other extremist websites, as well as publishing 
vitriolic comments about targeted politicians, criminal suspects as well as 
entire categories of individuals in and beyond the United Kingdom. Such 
activities go far beyond Facebook’s original and long-abandoned purpose 
of socialization among Ivy-league university students. While Facebook has 
expressed its commitment to removing such content, the platform remains 
one of several means for denunciatory and vitriolic coordination.2
Alongside more coordinated and politicized gatherings social media 
also offer citizens the opportunity to express frustration about everyday 
concerns, for example in the context of shared public spaces. In response 
to incivilities witnessed on a train, a bystander may digitally intervene by 
uploading evidence of the offending act, along with denunciatory words 
that capture their dismay. Such denunciations may be spontaneous, and 
one can imagine that they may be driven by civic motivations (for example, 
the desire for a safe and orderly daily commute) as opposed to furthering 
struggles between hegemonic and subaltern communities. Yet other users 
with diverging intentions can join in such denunciations by adding their 
own comments, sharing the footage with their social networks, and even 
supplementing it with additional details about the targeted individual or 
1 Poulter, ‘The Far Right Are Uniting’.
2 Thompson, ‘How Facebook Checks Facts’.
This content downloaded from 62.195.100.130 on Fri, 05 Feb 2021 15:01:50 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MediaTed ViSibiliT y aS Making ViTriol Meaningful 27
broader community. As a result, such denunciations can be co-opted for other 
purposes. They can also have a lasting impact on the lives of those targeted, 
as well as those belonging to the same (often disadvantaged) communities.
This kind of crowdsourced vitriol is a global phenomenon. Silicon Valley 
platforms such as Reddit and Twitter play a far-reaching role in denunciations 
and harassment in countless non-Western countries. Yet mediated vitriol 
is equally a local and nationalized phenomenon, with users in countries 
like China and Russia making either exclusive (in the case of the former) 
or preferred (in the case of the latter) use of national-origin platforms. In 
addition to national divergences, there are also instances of parallel online 
communities emerging along ideological lines. As conventional social media 
platforms have begun to monitor and curtail hate speech, ideologically 
bespoke platforms such as Voat and Gab have each gained prominence as 
Alt-Right equivalents to Reddit and Twitter, while Hatreon emerged as an 
alternative to the fundraising site Patreon.3
By focusing on highly visible forms of denunciation, this chapter considers 
how vitriol can be manifest as a form of civic engagement. These cases may 
amount to a reassertion of moral boundaries, which typically also carry 
identity-based dimensions. For this reason civic-led denunciations can 
become discriminatory and exclusionary, especially when this becomes 
a crowdsourced effort (which they are designed to be). Fleeting and situ-
ated moments of frustration may lead to a singular moment of mediated 
denunciation, which in turn may culminate into something much more 
impactful. Vitriolic words may – knowingly or otherwise – mobilize journal-
ists, populist organizations, and politicians along with their respective 
followers. This chapter considers a particular form of digitally mediated 
harassment that relies on the denunciation and sustained visibility of others. 
In the cases considered below, the image of the target is made accessible to 
an amorphous and volatile audience. By editorializing an event, users invoke 
a moral compass that can garner further attention and harm. Moreover 
seemingly ‘online’ interactions are not distinct from offline consequences, 
but rather are intimately connected, and can create and exacerbate problems 
in embodied contexts.
Previous scholarship considers online mobilizations from the lens of 
(digital) vigilantism.4 This refers to instances in which digital media users 
are offended (or feign being offended) by the words or actions of others, 
and seek to make both the offence and the targeted individual visible for 
3 Roose, ‘The Alt-Right’.
4 Trottier, ‘Digital Vigilantism’.
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punitive measures. Recent cases vary greatly in terms of offending acts, 
ranging from minor incivilities to criminal acts that capture public atten-
tion such as child exploitation and participating in riots. Likewise, public 
sentiment about the appropriateness of these denunciations may also vary 
signif icantly. A common feature in such cases is the inclusion of vitriolic 
discourse, which can be observed both in the initial denunciations, as well 
as in the ensuing commentary by a wider audience. However, the caustic 
nature of these words cannot be assessed in isolation. Rather, social harm 
is brought about through the manner in which these statements are seam-
lessly joined together with description of someone (including images and 
audio-visual footage) and their associations (including family, workplace, 
and communities to which they belong). An amplif ication of the target’s 
visibility leads to an amplif ication of any potential abuse.
Such developments speak to the ambivalence many users share about 
being visible online. On the one hand, digitally mediated visibility is partially 
self-asserted, and can be understood as a reasonably accessible form of 
self-expression and self-actualization. After all, in the vast majority of 
cases users knowingly decide to upload information about themselves 
to social media platforms. Even from a surveillance-studies perspective, 
being under the watchful eye of others can be understood as participatory 
and even empowering.5 Yet the sharing and subsequent circulation of that 
content may exceed the target’s expectations. In cases where digital media 
users denounce and coordinate against a target in response to statement or 
photograph that the target uploaded themselves, we may imagine that they 
were willingly engaging in some kind of self-expression, for example, to a 
group of peers. This speaks to how digitally mediated visibility is a collabora-
tive and decentralized endeavour, with several types of actors sharing no 
institutional or ideological alignment recirculate content originally posted 
to a social media account. Vitriolic discourses also act as a mobilizing force 
that invokes a broader audience either in support or against the denunciation. 
Yet either way it prompts a reaction, and ensures further visibility of the 
target and the initial message. Such efforts typically culminate in a targeted 
individual being rendered excessively visible as an object of discussion, 
without a reasonable opportunity to provide a response.
Unless the digital vigilante chooses to remain anonymous, their exposure 
and denunciation of a target can lead to themselves becoming the target 
of a potential counter-denunciation. This possibility reflects the fact that 
acceptable norms about f ilming and denouncing others are still being 
5 Albrechtslund, ‘Online Social Networking’.
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negotiated in the mediated public sphere. It bears noting that cases of 
digital vigilantism cover a moral gamut, and as such include offending 
acts that trigger widespread condemnation (such as the sexual abuse of 
children), as well as actions not necessarily considered objectionable by a 
broader audience (such as eating on public transit). Even in cases of widely 
condemned offences, public opinion may not support such interventions. For 
these reasons, scholarship must continue to focus on the public shaping of 
the perceived acceptability of digital vigilantism. Of particular concern here 
is the role of the state. By definition it remains excluded from participation 
in vigilante activities. Yet states may endorse or even f inancially support 
citizen-led initiatives, and make use of media channels to attempt to shape 
public perception of such movements.
The following sections provide an overview of contemporary vitriolic and 
vigilante landscapes in three national contexts: the United Kingdom, China 
and Russia. For each country we consider a recent case, and make use of 
press representations as well as other publicly available data about the event. 
In contrast to immediate responses to high-profile criminal acts that have 
been covered in other research, these cases are centred on comparatively 
banal incidents occurring in public spaces.6 These cases provide insight 
about a more prevalent form of vigilantism, one that may be located at 
the margins of what is considered acceptable in their respective social 
contexts. The purpose in juxtaposing them is not purely comparative, but 
rather to identify commonalities and divergences as topics for subsequent 
in-depth analysis.
United Kingdom: Disability and disregarded train seat 
reservations
While it would be impossible to provide an exhaustive account of UK-based 
mediated shaming and vigilantism in this chapter, what follows is a case 
study that provides both recent developments as well as historic antecedents. 
As such, we do not seek to establish causal links between any single media 
format, and user activity. Although online shaming may be considered as a 
product of digital media cultures, a cursory overview of punitive technologies 
in the UK reveals an array of embodied devices such as the pillory or the 
scold’s bridle, which restrained the targeted individual’s movement as well 
as speech. These served not only to punish transgressions, but in particular 
6 Nhan et al., ‘Digilantism’; Schneider and Trottier, ‘Social Media’.
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to do so in a public manner that disciplined both the target as well as those 
belonging to the same category, such as ‘quarrelsome women’ in the case 
of the scold’s bridle.7 Likewise, citizen-led interventions such as charivari 
and rough music had a distinctly public and performative character, in 
that they served to convey to a broad array of actors both the nature and 
the consequence of a transgressive act.8 The emergence and establishment 
of tabloid press furthered the scope and visibility of such denunciatory 
acts. In particular, these facilitated the circulation of imagery of a target 
of scorn, as well as vitriolic accounts of the target that had a broader and 
more lasting public reach.
We might think of digitally mediated shaming and its co-construction 
with British tabloids as a recent development. Yet as far back as 1998 the 
articles described how ‘[c]omputer hackers’ were ‘becoming cyber vigilantes’ 
in order to combat paedophilia, a social problem that received substantial 
media coverage at the time.9 Such anti-paedophile vigilantes have consist-
ently been presented in public discourse, often in conjunction with legal 
mechanisms. For example, Sarah’s law sought to enable the UK public ‘to 
f ind out if an individual in contact with a child has a record of child sexual 
offences’ through formal legal means.10 Other prominent cases include 
responses to animal abuse, such as the outrage that a Coventry woman 
received in 2010 when placing a cat into a garbage bin. Women have also 
been on the receiving end of online scrutiny for a range of other reasons 
in the UK, such as eating on public transit.11 In such cases, the press and 
tabloid media in particular served as prominent accounts of developments. 
In recent years there have been a number of cases in which digital media 
users have witnessed antisocial behaviour in public settings, and have 
uploaded photographs and their own accounts to their personal social 
media profiles. We consider one such case below.
In September 2016, a woman took a rush hour train from London to her 
hometown. She had a seating reservation in order to cope with a disability 
that left her in great discomfort if left to stand. Upon arriving at her seats 
(one of which was reserved for her caretaker), she encountered two men 
who occupied them and refused to move. She took a photograph of the 
men, and uploaded it to Facebook with her description of what transpired. 
7 Dobash and Dobash, ‘Community Response’, p. 567.
8 Johnson, ‘Charivari/Shivaree’.
9 Blackstock, ‘Hackers Make War’, p. 10.
10 Sarah’s Law.
11 Sanghani, ‘Why This Man Takes Photos’.
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Several aspects of this post are worth noting. First, she identif ies herself as 
a disabled passenger, explaining the additional necessity of the reserved 
seat, and further explaining why the offence in question is so actionable. 
She also includes the train time as well as destination, making the incident 
not only legible but also locatable to an undetermined audience, which may 
include journalists as well as representatives from the rail company. While 
avoiding explicitly vitriolic language, she makes extensive use of sarcasm, 
referring to the targets as ‘gentlemen’ and ‘charming fellows’, noting that 
their ‘wives and mothers would be proud.’ The latter is especially relevant, 
as through these words this statement not only appears to invoke a broader 
social network to bear witness to this offence, but in particular names the 
female members of the targets’ families for additional scrutiny and shaming 
(potentially of and by these women). Further categories are invoked in 
this denunciation, as the author notes that the two men were discussing 
luxury holidays. This, combined with the business attire that both men 
are wearing in the accompanying photograph, characterized the targets 
as socially aloof businessmen.
The f irst news articles reporting this incident were published the follow-
ing day, mostly in national and regional tabloids. These articles provided 
coverage of both the offending act as well as the mediated denunciation. 
Indeed, these initial reports relied heavily on the Facebook post and photo-
graph, often quoting its text in article titles as well as throughout the copy. 
Previously invoked categories such as ‘disabled woman’ and ‘businessmen’ 
also featured prominently. These journalists take some steps to distance 
their reporting from the initial denunciation, for example, through the 
use of quotation marks and terms such as ‘it is claimed’.12 Yet this press 
coverage largely serves to reproduce the discourse of the Facebook post. In 
the following days, subsequent articles provided additional perspectives of 
the incident on the train. This included one of the targets along with his 
father, as well as a friend of the disabled woman. Full names were often 
included, though reports also indicated when people (such as one of the 
two targets) wished to remain unnamed. These additional perspectives 
provided some nuance to the original incident, for example, by revealing 
that seat reservations had allegedly been cancelled on the train, and that the 
two targets claimed that they did not know the woman in question had a 
disability. These perspectives also served to extend coverage of the incident 
by an additional two days. Later articles also featured quotes from spokes-
people of the rail network, who provided insight regarding the company’s 
12 Chandler, ‘Disabled Woman Posts Facebook Photos’.
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reservation policies. Articles appeared in these newspapers the following 
week that made passing reference to the incident. They included comments 
from readers either supporting or condemning the initial denunciation, as 
well as journalists’ own editorializing. Here, authors often scaled up their 
denunciation to target broader societal conditions such as entitlement 
culture and ‘the nature of our violent society’.13
This reporting provides a pattern that can be found in other UK-based 
cases, in which a citizen uploads a denunciatory post on social media, and 
the press pick up on it over the course of the following days. In doing so 
the press call further attention to the cases, and the people implicated in 
them. Their framing of these cases may also shape public perception of 
the offending incident and response. As the original posts may be deleted 
or hidden through privacy settings, press coverage allows for a wider and 
more enduring audience. This audience may provide vitriolic comments 
when speaking to journalists, commenting online, or sharing links of these 
articles on their own social media accounts.
‘Unqualified as a mother and teacher’: Vitriol against a female 
passenger on a high-speed train in China
In Chinese history, policing has been conducted by the state through non-
physical coercion in addition to physical violence. This combined method 
is partly due to the influence of Confucian philosophy that the best way 
to maintain order is to establish intrinsic morality instead of strict rule, 
regulations and laws. The self-policing that is required by such a principle 
was practiced by people in a form of ‘village pacts’ in the Zhou Dynasty and 
became prevalent in the Song Dynasty.14 The village pact was essentially a 
form of neighbourhood surveillance and mutual warnings in response to 
breaches and transgressions that were regarded as harmful for the public 
welfare. The punishment to such breaches and transgressions were mostly 
non-physical spectacle of the dishonoured family, such as posters on the door, 
social isolation, expulsion from the pact and the registration of evil deeds.15
In contemporary China, vitriol is used as a tool of self-policing as well. 
On social media platforms, such punitive policing follows the exposure 
of illegal behaviours of various severities, from minor violations of traff ic 
13 Dowle, ‘Why We Must Not Stand’.
14 Dutton, ‘Policing and Punishment’.
15 Ibid.
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regulations, physical conflicts between individuals, to child abuse and 
paedophilia. Citizens also express their disappointment with the current 
Chinese legal system for not being comprehensive enough to govern the 
wide range of social activities. These issues are mostly immoral but legal or 
legally unclear, such as animal abuse, marital disputes and incivilities on 
public transportation. There are also denunciations reflecting an emerging 
online nationalism, which support state narratives and discipline those who 
challenge the state by rendering them visible online and shaming them 
with vitriolic statements.
Participants typically initiate vigilantism on private-owned social media 
platforms, such as Sina Weibo, Baidu Tieba, Douban, Tianya, among others.16 
After its establishment in 2009, Sina Weibo in particular has become the 
major platform where most influential online incidents take place, including 
vigilantism.17 Government accounts (including local police agencies and 
state ministries) post their own content and interact with net-citizens (neti-
zens) on a daily basis according to a 2017 statistical report.18 State-controlled 
and commercial media are highly active on Sina Weibo. Individual users, 
including civilians, celebrities and public opinion leaders also routinely 
produce, consume, and disseminate information on this platform.
Mass media and state institutions perpetuate the mediated visibility of 
vitriol. In China, state-owned and commercial media have different roles, 
characteristics and relations with the state. Commercial media are private 
companies and enjoy a relatively greater degree of freedom in terms of 
topic choices and editing.19 Some commercial media, such as Pengpai News 
Agency, Xinjingbao, Caixin, and Phoenix benefit from the reputation of keep-
ing up with trending societal issues. They report on and provide dedicated 
columns for hotly debated incidents. On the contrary, state-owned media 
started as part of the state propaganda apparatus from the establishment 
of People’s Republic of China to the Opening and Reform in 1978, and their 
administrative and staff ing issues are still directly controlled by the state 
even though they enjoy relative freedom in terms of their daily operation. 
16 Sina Weibo is a microblogging platform, usually regarded as the ‘Chinese Twitter’. Baidu 
Tieba is a bulletin board system established in 2003 that aims to provide a platform where 
people with the same interests can f ind each other by keyword searching. Douban is a website 
established in 2005 that provides user generated content of f ilms, music, books etc. Tianya is 
a social networking site established in 1999 that focuses on life and emotions in forms of user 
generated forums and blogs.
17 Sullivan, ‘A Tale of Two Microblogs’.
18 CNNIC, ‘2016 China Statistical Report’.
19 Winf ield and Peng, ‘Market or Party Controls?’.
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In addition, reports from state-owned media usually feature government 
announcements and responses. When an incident is regarded as a threat 
to social stability, however, state-owned media also produce articles of 
greater length to analyze the issue and provide a state-desired perspective 
and conclusion. In addition to state-owned media, the government has 
furthered the involvement of law enforcement in online matters. From 
2015, Internet Police in f ifty cities started their own Weibo, WeChat, and 
Baidu BBS accounts, in order to deter and stop cybercrime, harmful speech 
and behaviours, and to act on netizens’ reports about illegal behaviours 
on the Internet.20 The Internet Police is a state police division that is solely 
responsible for policing various Internet crimes, including online threats, 
spamming, pornography, terrorism, hacking and fraud. While the Internet 
Police encourages citizens to provide information in order to f ight crimes, 
the exposure of individuals’ personal information acquired illegally is 
outlawed. The establishment of such systems encourages citizens’ online 
self-policing. For this reason, Chinese citizens engage in vigilantism on 
even minor transgressions with f irm denunciations. Facilitated by a widely 
networked platform – Sina Weibo – and perpetuated by the broader media 
landscape, such visibility and vitriol tend to amplify and prolong the impact 
on individuals. We may consider a recent case about a minor transgression 
on public transportation.
In January 2018, a woman impeded a train’s departure because her 
husband was denied entry at the boarding gate. A passenger recorded and 
shared the conflict and the video went viral. The woman was given a penalty 
of 2,000 yuan (roughly 300 USD/255 Euro) and later suspended from her job 
as a deputy dean in a primary school. She appeared in two interview videos 
before and after the punishment was announced. In the f irst interview for a 
privately-owned short-video streaming website, she insisted that it was just 
a matter of ten seconds so that her husband could make it to the train and 
wondered why her behaviour was so poorly regarded. In the second interview 
on the CCTV (China Central Television) News Channel, she admitted that 
she was overreacting and caused troubles for both the railway staff and 
passengers, and wished to apologize, hoping that netizens would forgive her.
In the video that shows the transgression, the person behind camera 
constantly reminds the woman of the illegality of her behaviour: ‘Do you 
know it is illegal to do so?’ The shared video on Weibo provoked netizens’ 
denunciation with vitriol against the woman. There are between 4000 and 
7000 comments under each post from five major media Weibo accounts. Four 
20 Chinese Ministry of Public Security, ‘Jianli Wangjing’.
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types of vitriolic utterances can be observed among the above-mentioned 
comments. The f irst type is normative evaluations of her behaviour. She 
is regarded as a person who ‘has no respect of punctuality’, ‘has a horrible 
public manner’, ‘is unreasonable and making a scene’, and ‘endangers others’ 
safety’, which are concerning the qualities that a good citizen should have. In 
addition to direct negative evaluation of her behaviour, there are comments 
referring to her identity and social roles, including teacher, mother, and 
woman. Netizens show disgust by expressing concerns about her students 
and daughter: ‘I can’t imagine what kind of people/person her students/
daughter will become’. She is regarded as ‘unqualif ied as a teacher/mother’, 
and having ‘tarnished the occupation/the title ‘mother’’. She also received 
gender-specif ic vitriol such as ‘shrew’, and comments that emphasize her 
gender with terms like ‘as a woman…’. These utterances imply that a higher 
moral standard should be required for teachers, mothers, and women. 
Insulting and vulgar language are also observed in comments, such as 
calling the woman ‘psycho’, ‘trash’, regarding her as ‘despicable’, ‘disgusting’, 
asking her to ‘fuck off’, and wishing for her to suffer in the future through 
‘getting a divorce’, ‘being beaten up’, and ‘losing her job forever’. Sarcasm is 
a common strategy. For example, ‘dear teacher, … you taught us a valuable 
lesson that anything can be sacrif iced for our own good…’ is an instance 
of vitriol disguised in praise. Netizens’ responses target law enforcement 
for being too soft when forcing out the woman and giving her a penalty: 
‘The law enforcements treat their own rules as shit; no wonder people keep 
breaking it.’
The woman’s apology also attracts vitriol later. Netizens regard her 
apology as insincere because ‘She kept f inding excuses for her behaviour’ 
and conclude that ‘she’s only apologizing because her life was ruined’. They 
accuse her of lying in order to gain sympathy: ‘she has her ID card in her 
hand on the video (she claimed her husband had her ID card in the apology 
video). How dare she lie about such obvious thing! Does she think that all 
the netizens are retarded and have no common sense?’. They decide that 
they would not forgive her: ‘she deserves it!’ ‘NEVER!’ ‘We won’t need police 
if apology works’. These responses reveal an intention to socially exclude an 
individual who has misbehaved. User-led policing through vigilantism and 
can greatly harm a targets’ social standing, perhaps more so than through 
other policing mechanisms because an opportunity for rehabilitation is 
not provided. Instead, social exclusion for an undetermined period of time 
appears to be the desired outcome.
Commercial media play an essential role in perpetuating such long lasting 
visibility. Most commercial media provide the offender’s name or last name, 
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her job, and the school that she works for in their coverage. By mentioning the 
target’s occupation, commercial media implicitly echo netizens’ assumption 
of a higher moral standard for teachers. While state-owned media refer the 
target as ‘a female passenger’ most commercial media and social media 
articles refer the target as ‘a female teacher’.21 Some commercial media 
divert discussion in order to focus on the occupation. A journalist posted 
a special column entitled ‘How can directors of discipline avoid becoming 
monsters who stop the high-speed train’ on Tencent News, in which he 
emphasizes that teachers and other authority f igures are easily ‘alienated 
by the power they have at schools’.22
The majority of commercial media reports reproduce netizen vitriol in 
criticizing the offender’s lack of citizenship. They point out the potentially 
severe outcome of the offender’s behaviour, stressing that any disruption of 
train schedules might affect the dispatching of trains in different routes, and 
conclude that the offender lacks awareness of regulations and laws. There 
are also commercial media such as Xinjingbao, which have a reputation of 
reporting from different perspectives, giving the offender an opportunity to 
explain herself and questioning the punishment and online vitriol. However, 
netizens denounce the newspaper’s editors and reporters for ‘trying too 
hard for attention’. In contrast, state-owned media comment mainly on the 
general social implications of this incident. Beijing Daily emphasizes the 
necessity of citizenship training in terms of respecting the rule of law and 
the contract spirit. Guangming Daily criticizes the commercial media and 
some netizens for putting occupational labels on the offender, diverting 
the discussion and fanning the flame.23
Smile douchebag—you are on camera: Collectively mediated 
vitriol in Russia
It can be argued that current digitally mediated cases of collective denuncia-
tion and vitriol in Russia are largely influenced by the country’s Soviet past, 
where the public’s involvement in exercising justice over fellow comrades 
was a prevalent and encouraged practice.24 In cases of minor mischief, the 
delinquent was confronted through a system of comrades’ courts where 
21 Beijing Daily, ‘Lan Gaotie Shijian’.
22 Li, ‘How Can Directors of Discipline’.
23 Guangming Web Critic, ‘Weiguan’.
24 Gabdulhakov, ‘Citizen-led Justice’.
This content downloaded from 62.195.100.130 on Fri, 05 Feb 2021 15:01:50 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MediaTed ViSibiliT y aS Making ViTriol Meaningful 37
judge and jury were comprised of colleagues and neighbours. The severity 
of the shameful impact of such collective justice could be amplif ied through 
display of the target’s portrait on special boards of shame and through 
exposure in the local paper.25 Nowadays, mediated vigilantism in Russia 
still principally takes place as an encouraged, organized and systematic 
practice with an issue-specif ic retaliatory focus.
This section of the chapter seeks to provide a general overview of cases 
and trends related to mediated vitriol in contemporary Russia. From a 
seemingly universal practice of exposing alleged paedophiles to rather 
unique engagements with drivers and merchants, active citizens in Russia 
have been f inding offence in fellow citizens, retaliating, and exposing 
them across global and domestic social media platforms. Soviet boards 
of shame have been replaced with YouTube, Facebook, and VKontakte;26 
while traditional media outlets continue to widely report on ‘loud’ cases, 
rendering additional layers of visibility and exposure.
In Russia, organized acts of retaliation by citizens against fellow citizens 
share a common scenario where targets are confronted over offences while 
the process is f ilmed and the footage is spread widely. Vigilantes across 
the country have formed movements focused on specif ic offences. Some 
of these formations turn into recognizable brands. Among such brand-
like vigilante groups are StopXam [Stop a Douchebag] and Hrushi Protiv 
[Piglets Against],27 specializing in combating traff ic violations and exposing 
‘unscrupulous’ merchants respectively. Founded in 2010 by members of 
Russia’s state-organized youth movement Nashi [Ours],28 both formations 
were endorsed29 and funded by the government.30 Given this unique scenario 
where the state encourages an etymologically citizen-organized practice 
of vigilantism, it is important to consider, among other factors, the motives 
behind both organization and participation.
In widely available videos that have been viewed by millions, StopXam 
members approach the drivers and ask them to re-park their cars. If the 
driver does not comply, a sticker that reads ‘I Spit on Everyone I Drive Where 
I Want’31 is placed on the windshield of the vehicle, usually sparking hostility 
25 Ibid., p. 328.
26 Russia’s domestic prototype of Facebook and most popular social network.
27 English equivalents of group titles are taken from the off icial websites and social media 
accounts of the groups.
28 Kurochkin and Nikoforov, ‘Civic Initiatives’.
29 Kremlin, ‘Extended Meeting’.
30 Kurochkin and Nikoforov, ‘Civic Initiatives’.
31 Original translation orthography used by StopHam is preserved.
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as well as verbal and physical confrontations between participants and 
targets. The shameful signs are diff icult to remove and are intended to serve 
a ‘disciplinary purpose, as the driver should think about their behaviour 
while scratching off the sticker’.32 Some drivers receive several stickers 
during a single confrontation, which will impede their ability to drive off 
due to their restricted visibility.
Dressed in full-body piglet costumes, Hrushi Protiv target allegedly 
unscrupulous merchants and expose them online. Participants raid markets 
and grocery stores with the aim of disclosing expired products. Seeing 
a dozen ‘piglets’ browsing the aisles, the personnel confronts the self-
proclaimed auditors, sparking verbal and physical assaults between both 
parties. All raids are f ilmed, and edited footage is spread across social media. 
Content analysis of video material produced by Hrushi Protiv reveals a bias 
against merchants of non-Russian descent. The group frames people from 
the Caucasus33 and labour migrants from the former-Soviet Central Asian 
republics as responsible for expired produce on the shelves of Russia’s stores. 
In 2014, Hrushi Protiv called on its audience to sign petitions to ‘condemn 
migrants from working in retail’.34 Though it received marginal online 
support, this call for action is suggestive of a political stance of the group. 
Along with proportionality of retaliation, questions concerning political 
instrumentalization of digital vigilantes inevitably arise.
Virtually every video produced by StopXam and Hrushi Protiv contains 
cases of violent verbal or physical confrontations and shaming of the drivers 
and the merchants. These confrontations and mediated public shaming 
serve as both entertainment and disciplinary show for the passer-by, for 
the online audience, and for traditional media consumers when featured 
on TV and in newspapers. Both groups publish several videos per month 
and possess editorial powers, which grant them the ability to frame the 
target and the process of retaliation.35 Unless they are famous people with 
a large social media following, targets have limited options to generate a 
counter-narrative. If a digital vigilante group has an audience of millions, 
their target with a few hundred friends on social networks cannot compete 
with such social outreach.36
32 Interview with former StopXam member, April 2018.
33 Some Republics in the Caucasus are part of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, due to 
ethnic biases, Russian citizens from the Caucasus are sometimes perceived as alien migrants 
not only by Russian nationalists, but also by immigration and law enforcement off icers.
34 Russia’s Public Initiative, ‘Call for a legislative ban’.
35 Gabdulhakov, ‘Citizen-led Justice’, p. 327.
36 Gabdulhakov, ‘In the Bullseye of Vigilantes’, p. 233.
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Videos produced by vigilantes are actively commented on by the viewers. 
While some viewers question the acts of participants, the majority express 
solidarity and condemn targets in a biased fashion. Videos where drivers and 
merchants are framed as non-Russians are commented on in the following 
manner: ‘this is a zoo, not a store’, or ‘as always, the mountain folk is acting 
like animals’, ‘they are used to riding donkeys in their villages, and here 
they have to abide the rules’. Comments also bring up speculations about 
the targets’ legal status in Russia: ‘they are afraid of cameras because they 
do not have a registration’, ‘why is every other Central Asian so afraid of 
cameras? Are they illegals? I suggest our immigration forces look closely 
at this group’.
While traditional media could theoretically serve as a platform for targets 
to deliver their side of the story, media analysis reveals that Russia’s main-
stream broadcasters rely on participants’ footage as evidence, which is an 
explicitly subjective representation of events. Traditional media coverage 
leads to greater exposure of targets and profile raising of vigilantes, mak-
ing the latter appear as an omnipresent eye of the public. Words such as 
‘activists’, ‘youth’, ‘public movement’, and ‘volunteers’ have been used by 
Russia’s mainstream media outlets to define StopXam and Hrushi Protiv. In 
reference to the targets, media reports tend to use phrases such as ‘aggressive’ 
and ‘inadequate’. A number of media reports make direct references to the 
targets’ ethnic and national backgrounds through use of othering wording 
such as ‘the Chechens’, or ‘people from the Caucasus’, or ‘the Tajiks’, thus 
copying vigilantes’ biases and prioritizing ethnic origins and nationality 
as identity markers for the ‘bellicose’ targets.
What is distinguishable in digital vigilantism is the severity and longev-
ity of retaliation. For instance, for grocery stores, an inspection by state 
consumer protection services could lead to investigations and any short-
comings would end in f ines for the concerned retailor, without the public 
necessarily getting involved in mob justice, chanting and pointing out the 
ethnic origin of the manager or other employees. In current practices of 
mediated vitriol and exposure, the concerned retailer’s reputation can be 
severely damaged without any legal investigation, but by means of edited 
video reports produced by self-proclaimed auditors. These circumstances 
grant peculiar powers to participants, as, theoretically, they can be hired 
by competitor stores as ‘reputation assassins’. Some large retailers in Russia 
even went as far as signing special collaboration agreements with Hrushi 
Protiv,37 which grants further legitimacy to otherwise unsanctioned raids.
37 Vigilantes, ‘Hrushi Protiv’.
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Social media platforms play a unique role as providers of a stage for 
vigilante practices. This role is not a passive one, as terms of use as well 
as state legislation in which platforms operate govern harmful and inap-
propriate content. Platforms can rate certain videos as 18+, remove them, 
f ilter commentary, and otherwise censor users. Arrests over ‘likes’ and 
‘shares’ on social media have sprawled across Russia in recent years.38 
However, sometimes no action is taken against users.39 YouTube, in this 
regard, is successfully instrumentalized by both StopXam and Hrushi Protiv, 
with millions of viewers and income generated through advertisements. 
Videos with obscene content freely circulate the web, which reflects the 
default involvement of platforms in disseminating vitriolic confrontations 
and exposure of targets. Global circulation of videos grants recognition to 
participants far beyond their local communities. Both StopXam and Hrushi 
Protiv have branches in other former Soviet republics and in the case of the 
former, even on other continents.40
The combination of social justice practices and political agendas repro-
duces a convoluted dynamic between the state, participants, targets, media 
platforms (both traditional and social), as well as the audience.41 In such a 
setting, the boundaries of power division are blurred, proportionality and 
legality of retaliation become questionable, and citizen-on-citizen retaliation 
takes on a totalitarian and pervasive mode.
Discussion
While these three examples of mediated vigilantism concern different 
political and cultural contexts, some common features stand out. Each 
case is a response to incivilities that take place in (quasi-)public spaces such 
as grocery stores, shared roadways and train carriages. We can imagine 
these to be contested terrains due to external factors such as the edacity of 
markets, a scarcity of seating/parking, or a surfeit of passengers or vehicles. 
In addition to witnessing laws and regulations being violated, we may 
38 Bevza, ‘To Fabricate a Case’.
39 Although StopXam was off icially liquidated in 2018, Ministry of Justice of Russia made 
the decision over the group’s violation of accounting procedures, and not over video content or 
vigilante practices.
40 StopXam prototype Mal Estacionado [Bad Parking] was opened in Lima, Peru, upon approval 
of the original group in Moscow.
41 Manifested through a hierarchy of power, from the highest ranks of policymakers to police 
off icers on the ground and other state entities whose functions are performed by digital vigilantes.
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also speculate whether a sense of entitlement to these spaces may further 
compel citizens to denounce those who are deemed to breach a moral 
order. Furthermore, we can speculate whether such a sense of moral order 
may also be sought in quasi-public digital spaces when vigilantes retaliate 
against online incivilities.
These cases also raise the question of who is entitled to speak out against 
their peers. In order to succeed in openly denouncing someone, digital media 
users depend not only on an audience for support, but also on the press 
to provide further coverage of the incident. In all three cases we see that 
mediated vitriol is above all else a collaborative effort. In turn, newspapers 
source quotes from online posts, reach out to friends and family of those who 
are implicated, and invite readers to comment and share reports as well. This 
is partly out of necessity, in order for journalists to produce a news-story 
out of what often begins as a social media post. Yet it also demonstrates one 
manner in which media assemblages work: through temporary partnerships 
and collaborations with a range of actors. As such, even toxic and anti-social 
discourse may become a core component of routine news cycles.
A further commonality to these cases is that even when a single in-
dividual is being targeted, the denunciation itself also mobilizes social 
categories. Offensive conduct in trains and on streets is rhetorically coupled 
to broader representatives of a particular ethnic group or nationality, 
groups like the wealthy, as well as professions such as teachers, with all 
the social expectations that are bundled with such a position. Shaming 
and vitriol are typically gendered as well, with denunciations serving as 
an opportunity for citizens to air grievances against ‘shrews’ and those 
deemed to be unf it mothers.
All three cases demonstrate how vitriol and mediated visibility are 
related: afforded by digital platforms, denunciation accompanied by vitriolic 
discourse makes individuals visible online, which provokes further translocal 
denunciations against them. Such vitriol and visibility are most likely to be 
amplif ied by traditional media, which adds to the layered harm inflicted on 
individuals. Therefore, the contemporary study of vitriol in media needs to 
consider how targets are rendered visible. Mediated visibility may serve as a 
kind of force multiplier for leveraging harm against a target or a community. 
In particular, these mechanisms further serve to persecute and marginalize 
women and members of disadvantaged communities. Religious, ethnic, 
gender, and other prejudices come to surface in cases of citizens’ collective 
response to perceived infraction committed by target. In a recent incident 
in Russia surrounding a public discussion of sexual assault the common 
narrative in response to the female victim of sexual violence is ‘you should 
This content downloaded from 62.195.100.130 on Fri, 05 Feb 2021 15:01:50 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
42 daniel TroT Tier, Qian Huang and raSHid gabdulHakoV 
not have seduced the man’ and ‘what were you doing at a party anyhow’.42 
This narrative is backed with legislation decriminalizing some domestic 
violence and softening punishment for f irst offence in sexual assault.43 
In many cases, targets of digital vigilantism are limited in their options 
of seeking justice. Going public with the case can lead to an ever-greater 
exposure, shaming, and societal condemnation. Gender, sexual, national, 
ethnic, religious and other flaws and biases set ground for layers of vulner-
abilities among some members of the society.44 In the aftermath of terrorist 
attacks in Russia’s major cities, the promptly identif ied suspects tend to be 
‘Muslim-looking’ males from the Caucasus. In one such instance the wrongly 
accused target reported themselves to police, in order to prove their own 
innocence and restore a damaged reputation. While police confirmed the 
person’s innocence, the mediated exposure turned out to be diff icult to 
revert. When attempting to travel back to his hometown, the target was 
forced off the plane by other passengers and faced perpetuated instances 
of questioning by police and short-term arrests.45
It is therefore important to take a scholarly and societal approach 
towards mediated harassment that recognizes that while potentially 
anybody can be targeted by collective scorn and denunciation, these medi-
ated practices typically reproduce and even aggravate existing disparities. 
In terms of directions for subsequent research, scholars should further 
consider links between media studies and criminological accounts of vitriol 
in denunciatory contexts. In particular, they should consider vitriolic 
denunciation as a chain of mediated events, rendered meaningful through 
networks of decentralized actors. The above cases suggest that press 
coverage of denunciations may signif icantly contribute to the exposure 
and harassment of a targeted individual, and this is a topic scholars should 
continue to examine. Yet we should also be mindful of our own potential 
contribution to mediated exposure and shaming through our analysis 
of prominent as well as relatively obscure cases. We can take steps to 
attempt to protect the identities of those involved, yet our reliance on 
press coverage may still render them identif iable. And while the readership 
of an academic text may pale in comparison to a viral social media post 
or tabloid article, it may remain archived and potentially accessible to a 
wider audience.
42 Kupfer, ‘How Russia Turned on a Teenage Rape Victim’.
43 BBC, ‘Russian MPs Pass Bill’.
44 Gabdulhakov, ‘In the Bullseye of Vigilantes’.
45 Russia Today, ‘Leave Me Alone!’.
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When searching for remedies to online vitriol, one cannot simply mute 
the so-called ‘court of public opinion’.46 From a practical standpoint, media-
savvy audiences can take advantage of multiple platforms, and spill out into 
the comments sections of any online newspaper, or the reply function of any 
social platform. The fact that such visible opinions (in the forms of comments 
and replies) can either be fuelled by strategically constructed (fake) news, 
or itself the product of a Twitter bot, remains a pressing concern. As well, 
self-erasure or self-censorship is neither sufficient to prevent receiving online 
vitriol, nor is it a desirable state of existence for potential targets. As the 
examples above demonstrate, other individuals and institutions make use of 
one’s social visibility. Remedies for specific instances of vitriolic harassment, 
as well as more general strategies for prevention, need to prioritize the 
autonomy of the person being targeted.
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